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“Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing.” [FN1] 
 
  While hostile takeovers [FN2] have become the exception in recent years, they continue to play a 
significant role in the acquisition of publicly traded companies. [FN3]  Inasmuch as hostile takeovers are 
by nature adverse to the management strategies and positions of target corporations, Delaware courts 
[FN4] have reviewed *430 defensive measures implemented by interested boards with enhanced 
scrutiny. [FN5]  Specifically, management decisions aimed at thwarting unfriendly contests for control 
are generally assessed under the two-prong standard announced in the landmark decision of Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp. [FN6] before they will be accorded the protections of the deferential 
business judgment rule. [FN7]  The cases decided by Delaware’s Supreme Court and specialized Court 
of Chancery in the wake of Unocal have created a takeover jurisprudence that rounds out and 
purportedly refines the standards for reviewing the fiduciary duties of interested managers in this 
context. [FN8] 
 
  Over the years, numerous commentators have argued that the Unocal standard has been watered down 
to that of a dressed-up business judgment rule. [FN9] In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, [FN10] the *431 
Court of Chancery questioned the efficacy of a deferential application of the Unocal test and, in the 
process, delved into an interesting discussion of the interplay between the test announced in Unocal and 
the one created in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., another important Court of Chancery decision. 
[FN11]  Blasius involved a target corporation whose board of directors, in response to an unfriendly bid, 
adopted defensive measures designed to repress the dissident shareholders’ ability to elect a majority of 
the company’s board. [FN12] Recognizing the prominence of the shareholder voting process, Chancellor 
Allen established a “compelling justification” standard for evaluating management decisions made with 
the “primary purpose” of interfering with the shareholder franchise. [FN13]  While the standard of 
review created by the Blasius court has been described by the Delaware judiciary as “onerous” because 
of its demanding “compelling justification” showing, it has also, as a practical matter, been limited 
significantly to the atypical facts of that case. 
 
  Left unanswered by Blasius and the numerous cases decided thereafter was whether Blasius’ 
“compelling justification” standard operated as a separate and distinct test from Unocal’s standard of 
review or whether it simply served to augment Unocal’s “reasonableness” prong for assessing the 
proportionality of managerial responses to perceived threats by hostile bidders. [FN14] Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court has held Unocal applicable to all defensive measures including those touching 
upon issues of corporate control, [FN15] it has also classified measures implicating the shareholder 
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franchise as strongly suspect, stating that such measures will pass muster only if justified by compelling 
reasons. [FN16]  In theory, a unified approach that merges these two standards of review adequately 
safeguards the sanctity of the shareholder voting *432 process.  Indeed, Unocal rests upon the premise 
that preclusive and coercive measures will be struck down as inequitable.  As discussed herein, however, 
the reluctance of the Delaware Supreme Court to protect rigorously the franchise while applying Unocal 
exposes the shareholder electorate to substantial manipulation and risk.  When one considers that 
“matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve consideration[s] not present in 
any other context in which directors exercise delegated power,” [FN17] this problem is magnified even 
further.  This Article argues that the scope of Blasius’ reach should be recalibrated to encompass those 
defensive measures having a “substantial effect” upon the ability of shareholders to exercise their 
franchise freely.  This approach, whether applied in tandem with Unocal or as a freestanding doctrine, 
will empower courts with a practical framework for safeguarding this fundamental pillar of corporate 
governance. 
 
  Part I of this Article explores and defines hostile takeovers and, in the process, briefly discusses the 
different waves of hostile takeover activity in the United States.  It next describes a sampling of common 
defensive measures adopted by corporate boards in response to hostile bidders.  Finally, it identifies the 
inherent conflicts of interest accompanying board decisions adopting defensive measures in order to 
understand Delaware’s displacement of the business judgment rule as the default standard for adjudging 
management’s fiduciary duties in this context. 
 
  Part II focuses on the Unocal decision, and the two-prong test created therein, which has become the 
cornerstone of Delaware’s hostile takeover jurisprudence.  It next chronicles and discusses a number of 
subsequent cases leading up to Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., [FN18] a case in which the 
Delaware Supreme Court revisited Unocal to explain and expand upon its holding.  In addition to 
illustrating how courts apply Unocal in different factual settings, these cases highlight the judiciary’s 
deferential application of that doctrine.  This Part concludes with an analysis of the Blasius decision, 
which lays the foundation for the balance of this Article. 
 
  Part III begins with an in-depth overview of the Court of Chancery’s decision in Chesapeake and 
proceeds to analyze that court’s discussion of the interrelationship between the respective *433 
standards of Blasius and Unocal.  Specifically, it uses Chesapeake as a model for exposing the policy 
concerns attributable to Delaware’s reflexive application of Unocal.  This Part predicts that, absent 
change, Blasius’ basic legal tenets will continue to be suppressed as a practical matter, notwithstanding 
the Delaware judiciary’s purported commitment to closely scrutinizing board actions touching upon the 
shareholder franchise. 
 
  This Article concludes in Part IV that the current approach misses the mark inasmuch as Delaware’s 
corporate law rests on the precept that shareholders, as the owners of corporations, are entitled to decide, 
via their franchise, decisions affecting corporate control.  Specifically, it argues that if inherently 
interested boards are going to implement defensive measures substantially compromising the 
shareholder franchise at such a critical time in the life of a corporation, directors should be required to 
demonstrate that their actions were truly necessary and in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.  Because of the monumental import of the franchise and the heightened potential for 
directorial abuse in this setting, this Article advocates shifting the onus from the shareholders to the 
directors who are better suited to justify the merits of suspect defensive measures and have the most to 
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A. Takeover Defined 
 
  A takeover is generally defined as a stock purchase offer in which the acquiror is seeking to buy a 
controlling block of stock in a target company. [FN19]  The controlling block of stock usually enables 
the purchasing shareholder to elect the target’s board of directors and to effectuate mergers. [FN20]  
This Article focuses on hostile takeovers, a subset of takeovers in which the bidder operates *434 
without the support of the target’s current board of directors. [FN21] 
 
B. A Brief History of Hostile Takeovers 
 
  Numerous waves of merger and acquisition activity have transcended the American economy. [FN22]  
The 1980s witnessed an explosion of acquisition practice, particularly with respect to hostile takeovers 
which dominated that decade. [FN23]  While the hostile activity of the “Decade of Greed” [FN24] 
slowed considerably in the early 1990s as a result of “the after- effects of the October 1987 stock market 
crash, the collapse of the junk-bond market, and tight credit conditions, as well as other business and 
market factors,” [FN25] that cooling off period was short-lived. 
 
  The latter half of the 1990s witnessed a resurgence of hostile bids that continues today, especially in 
light of the recent economic downturn that has left many companies trading at prices significantly below 
their bullish highs. [FN26]  While the ruthless tenor that tainted hostile takeovers in the 1980s has 
lessened in degree, *435 large-scaled initial hostile bids currently serve as a strategically potent option 
for acquiring companies. [FN27]  As such, hostile takeovers remain very much alive as acquisition 
vehicles threatening the directorships of incumbent managers sitting on targeted boards. 
 
C. Defensive Responses to Hostile Bids 
 
  As was the case in the 1980s, hostile takeovers continue to motivate directors of target boards to 
undertake strategies aimed at frustrating unwelcome suitors.  The types of defensive measures that 
directors can implement in response to hostile bidders are as numerous as the creative board can 
imagine.  In order to lay the appropriate foundation for this Article’s analysis of the fiduciary duties of 
management in this setting, this Part focuses on two popular responses adopted by corporate boards. 
 
  1. Shareholder Rights Plans 
 
  A shareholder rights plan, commonly referred to as a “poison pill,” is one of the most potent and 
common defensive measures utilized by corporate managers for deterring hostile bids. [FN28]  While 
there are a number of different variations on the poison pill, the basic idea is that, upon the occurrence of 
a given triggering event (e.g., the announcement of an acquiror’s tender offer or an acquiror’s purchase 
of a given percentage of the target’s shares), “rights” become operational to all target shares except 
-3- 
 
those held by the would-be acquiror. [FN29]  These rights most commonly allow the shareholders of the 
target corporation to purchase, among other things, shares of the acquiror or target at a severely 
discounted price or sell their shares back to the target at a substantial premium. [FN30]  The effect of 
triggering the poison pill renders the cost of proceeding with the acquisition so prohibitively expensive 
[FN31] that, as a practical matter, the acquiror is forced to initiate a proxy contest with the hope of 
gaining control *436 of the target corporation.  This will enable the acquiror to appoint new 
management, remove the rights plan, and go forward with its intended deal. [FN32] 
 
  2. Classified Boards 
 
  The standard corporate board in Delaware consists of directors who are each elected to one-year terms. 
[FN33]  The significance of this from an acquiror’s perspective is that the longest it would have to wait 
to elect the entire board of directors after gaining control of a company is one year.  As a result, target 
corporations will often implement classified or staggered boards in which the terms of their directors are 
separated into three groups, each serving staggered terms of three years. [FN34]  This structure ensures 
that it will take up to two years for an unwelcome acquiror to gain control of a given company’s board 
and three years for an acquiror to dominate totally that board. [FN35]  In this context, where an acquiror 
is seeking to proceed with an unfriendly transaction, such a delay can serve as a significant obstacle. 
[FN36] 
 
D. The Business Judgment Rule 
 
  The business judgment rule has become the traditional standard used by courts for reviewing the 
actions of directors. [FN37]  “A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.” 
[FN38] “Under the business judgment rule, directors’ decisions are presumed to have been *437 made 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.” [FN39] Thus, a court’s decision to apply this rule affords corporate management 
extreme deference and “[w]hen a court invokes the ‘business judgment rule,’ the defendant directors (or 
managers) almost always win.” [FN40] 
 
  The protections of the deferential business judgment rule are not, however, absolute.  A showing that a 
board breached its duty of good faith, loyalty, or due care is sufficient for rebutting the rule’s 
presumption. [FN41]  As a general matter, though, the business judgment rule protects the substance of 
most management decisions from second-guessing by courts. [FN42] 
 
  A board’s decision to adopt defensive measures in response to an unfriendly contest for control is an 
example of a situation where the traditional business judgment rule does not apply as the default 
standard of review. [FN43]  The rationale for this exception lies in the adversarial atmosphere of hostile 
takeovers and the inherent conflicts of interest attendant to defensive decisions made by directors facing 
alleged threats to control. [FN44]  By definition, *438 target boards in this setting stand opposed to an 
acquiror’s desire to acquire their company.  Consequently, there exists the danger that incumbent 
directors may be acting out of a concern to protect their own positions when responding to these threats.  
Thus, before a board’s defensive measures will be afforded the protections of the business judgment 







Unocal and its Progeny 
 
  Before the decisions of corporate boards will be accorded the protections of the business judgment rule 
in the context of hostile takeovers, directors must satisfy the two-step showing established by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal. [FN46]  Referred to today as “enhanced judicial scrutiny,” [FN47] 
Unocal requires that directors responding to hostile overtures for control demonstrate, first, that “they 
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” [FN48] 
and, second, that the “defensive measures [undertaken in response thereto were] reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed.” [FN49]  The purported impact of this standard in this area of the law has been 
extraordinary. [FN50] 
 
A. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
 
  The dispute in Unocal centered on Unocal Corporation’s *439 (Unocal) initiation of a selective self-
tender offer for its shares [FN51] in response to the commencement of a two-tier, front-loaded tender 
offer [FN52] aimed at achieving control of Unocal by a contingent of its minority shareholders-namely 
Mesa Petroleum Co., Mesa Asset Co., Mesa Partners II, and Mesa Eastern, Inc. (collectively “Mesa”). 
[FN53]  The Delaware Supreme Court refused to adopt the Court of Chancery’s “blanket rule” 
conclusion that a selective self-tender offer could never be permissible. [FN54]  Instead, the Supreme 
Court framed the issues in Unocal as whether “the Unocal board had the power and duty to oppose a 
takeover threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if so, [whether its 
selective self- tender offer was] entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.” [FN55]  The 
court quickly concluded that boards of Delaware corporations were empowered to adopt defensive 
measures like the selective self-tender offer at issue in Unocal [FN56] and turned its attention to the 
standards for assessing the duties of corporate managers in this context. [FN57] 
 
  Not surprisingly, the court began with a discussion of the business judgment rule, [FN58] finding that 
while that standard of review *440 was still applicable in the takeover setting, the defendant directors 
had to satisfy two initial showings in light of the “omnipresent specter” that the directors might be acting 
with an eye toward retaining their offices. [FN59]  The court then announced the two-prong 
reasonableness-proportionality standard that has become the recognized test for assessing the defensive 
decisions of management. [FN60] 
 
  1. The Reasonableness Prong 
 
  Unocal’s board argued that Mesa’s two-tier tender offer posed a danger that threatened the interests of 
Unocal’s non-Mesa shareholders. [FN61]  The court found that the directors reasonably believed that the 
value of the company was “substantially above” the cash price offered to Unocal’s shareholders by 
Mesa at the front end of its proposed deal. [FN62] Additionally, the debt-leveraged securities that Mesa 
intended to compensate the remaining Unocal shareholders with at the back end squeeze out merger 
were valued significantly below the cash price guaranteed at the *441 front end. [FN63]  The court 
noted that “such offers are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering 
at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the 
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transaction.” [FN64]  Accordingly, the court found that Unocal’s directors had perceived Mesa’s actions 
as a reasonable threat. [FN65] 
 
  2. The Proportionality Prong 
 
  Unocal’s purpose for adopting the selective self-tender offer in response to Mesa’s offer was twofold.  
The board’s objective was “either to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, 
provide [a substantial percentage] of its stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept ‘junk 
bonds’, [sic] with [a significantly greater amount] of senior debt.” [FN66]  The court accepted the 
validity of the board’s above noted justifications for its adoption of the selective self-tender offer. 
[FN67] Moreover, the court accepted the exclusion of Mesa from Unocal’s selective self-tender. [FN68]  
If Mesa was permitted to participate in Unocal’s offer to its shareholders, reasoned the court, Unocal 
would be “subsidizing” Mesa’s greenmail threat by allowing Mesa to enjoy the premium offer of $54 
per share. [FN69]  Additionally, “Mesa could not, by definition, fit within the class of shareholders 
being protected from its own coercive and inadequate tender offer.” [FN70]  The court therefore had 
little trouble concluding that Unocal’s selective self-tender offer was “reasonably related to the threats 
posed.” [FN71] 
 
  3. The Business Judgment Rule 
 
  After finding Mesa’s two-tier tender offer to be a reasonable threat and the Unocal board’s defensive 
response to be proportional, the court stated that if Unocal’s directors were independent, the business 
judgment rule would apply for the purpose of *442 evaluating their decision. [FN72]  The Delaware 
Supreme Court deferred to the Court of Chancery’s determination that Unocal’s decision to counter 
Mesa’s strategy comported with the precepts of the business judgment rule and concluded with the 
familiar Delaware adage that the “[c]ourt [would] not substitute its judgment for that of [Unocal’s] 
board.” [FN73] 
 
B. The Second Round of Cases 
 
  Unocal was clear in its announcement of an enhanced level of scrutiny for evaluating board decisions 
aimed at inhibiting hostile takeovers.  What was unclear after Unocal, though, was the extent to which 
subsequent cases would interpret and apply that standard of review.  This sub-Part explores a number of 
the important cases that followed Unocal and helped to shape its present doctrine. [FN74] 
 
 1. Moran v. Household International, Inc. 
 
  The Delaware Supreme Court decided Moran v. Household International, Inc.  [FN75] a few months 
after Unocal.  Moran involved another action in which the applicability of the business judgment rule 
was discussed against the backdrop of a threat to corporate control.  In Moran, the directors of 
Household International, Inc. (Household) adopted a shareholder rights plan over the objections of one 
of Household’s directors. [FN76]  Unlike Unocal, the defensive measure at issue in Moran was “adopted 
to ward off possible future advances and not [as] a *443 mechanism adopted in [response] to a specific 
threat.” [FN77]  After finding that the board’s adoption of the rights plan was within the powers of 
Household’s board of directors, [FN78] the court discussed the interplay of the business judgment rule 




  With respect to the reasonableness prong of the Unocal test, the court began by noting the absence of 
any allegations of bad faith or entrenchment motives on the part of the defendant directors. [FN80]  It 
then surmised that the Household board had “adequately demonstrated . . . that the adoption of the 
Rights Plan was in reaction to what it perceived to be the threat in the market place of coercive two-tier 
tender offers.” [FN81]  There was no allegation that Household’s board had failed to act with proper 
business judgment in adopting the pill, nor was there any showing that the board had failed in its duty to 
properly inform itself of the issues accompanying the adoption of the poison pill in question. [FN82]  
Thus, the court easily found that the board had acted reasonably in adopting the rights plan in response 
to what it perceived as the prospective threat of coercive two-tier tender offers. [FN83]  It next examined 
the second inquiry of the Unocal test. [FN84] 
 
  The court began its analysis of Unocal’s proportionality prong by noting the coercive concerns of the 
directors that motivated their decision to adopt the shareholder rights plan. [FN85]  It concluded that the 
adoption of the rights plan was “a proportionate response to the theoretical threat of a hostile takeover, 
in part, because it did not ‘strip’ the stockholders of their right to receive tender offers and did not 
fundamentally restrict proxy contests, *444 i.e., was not preclusive.” [FN86]  The court emphasized that 
subsequent decisions by the board not to redeem the poison pill when presented with an actual offer 
would be subjected to Unocal analysis. [FN87]  In other words, management’s decision not to redeem 
the poison pill would itself constitute a defensive tactic that would require the directors to demonstrate 
under Unocal that they did not “arbitrarily reject the offer.” [FN88]  Thus, Household’s proactive 
adoption of the poison pill was sustained by the court as comporting with Unocal’s mandate. [FN89] 
 
  2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 
 
  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings [FN90] explores the duties of target boards where the 
sale of a company has become inevitable.  In response to Pantry Pride, Inc.’s (Pantry Pride) desire to 
acquire Revlon, Inc. (Revlon), Revlon’s board adopted a host of defensive measures aimed at stymieing 
Pantry Pride’s efforts. [FN91]  These defensive measures included a poison pill and repurchase program, 
both of which were initially found by the Supreme Court to be reasonable in response to the threat posed 
by Pantry Pride. [FN92] 
 
  After Pantry Pride raised its offer two times and Revlon’s board authorized its management to initiate 
merger discussions with third parties, however, “it became apparent to all that the break-up of the 
company was inevitable.” [FN93]  Once it became certain that the company was for sale, the court 
found that “[t]he duty of the board had just changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” [FN94]  
Viewed under Unocal’s rubric as developed more fully below, the board’s failure *445 to secure the best 
price reasonably available to all shareholders was violative of Unocal as a disproportionate response. 
[FN95] 
 
  Revlon’s board identified Forstmann Little & Co. (Forstmann) as a suitable acquiror and eventually 
granted it a lock-up provision. [FN96]  By virtue of the fact that the sale of Revlon had become 
inevitable, however, the court found that granting Forstmann a lock-up provision ran afoul with the 
fiduciary duties of Revlon’s directors, which required them to act proportionately in ascertaining the 
best price reasonably available for the company’s shareholders. [FN97]  The court then turned to the no-
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shop provision, which had similarly been enjoined by the Court of Chancery. [FN98]  Like the lock-up 
provision, “[t]he no-shop provision, . . . while not per se illegal, [was found to be] impermissible under 
the Unocal standards when a board’s primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling 
the company to the highest bidder.” [FN99]  This holding established the important duty of directors to 
get the highest value reasonably available when facing inevitable changes in control.  While the two 
opinions following immediately below help to define which changes in control require directors to seek 
the highest price for their shareholders in accordance with their fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, 
and due care, they also illustrate Delaware’s varying applications of Unocal. 
 
  *446 3. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 
 
  In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [FN100] Time, Inc. (Time) and Warner Brothers, 
Inc. (Warner) agreed to formalize plans for a merger of the two companies. [FN101]  After both boards 
approved the merger [FN102] and proxy statements were disseminated to Time’s shareholders for 
approval of the deal, [FN103] Paramount Communications, Inc. (Paramount) entered the fray with an 
“all-cash offer to purchase all outstanding shares of Time for $175 per share.” [FN104]  Despite the fact 
that Paramount’s offer far exceeded Time’s trading stock price, [FN105] Time’s board viewed it 
negatively and declined to proceed with any negotiations on the purported basis that the offer was 
inadequate as to price and that its proposed combination with Warner was in the better interests of 
Time’s shareholders. [FN106] 
 
  After a series of meetings in which Time met to evaluate Paramount’s offer,  “[t]he board’s prevailing 
belief was that Paramount’s bid posed a threat to Time’s control of its own destiny and retention of the 
‘Time Culture’ . . . [and] maintained its position that a combination with Warner offered greater 
potential for Time.” [FN107]  After Time and Warner restructured their deal to inhibit Paramount’s 
pursuit, Paramount raised its negotiable offer to $200 per share. [FN108]  When Time’s board also 
rejected that premium as inadequate and not in the best interests of Time’s shareholders when compared 
to the Warner deal, Paramount filed suit. [FN109]  After affirming the Court of Chancery’s finding that 
Revlon did not apply, the Supreme Court reviewed Time’s defensive responses to Paramount’s 
substantial (and negotiable) offers under the Unocal doctrine. [FN110] 
 
  *447 Time’s board identified numerous threats posed by Paramount’s all-cash, all-shares tender offer 
including: (1) inadequate value; (2) the possibility that shareholders would erroneously tender out of 
mistake or ignorance of the benefits that a Time-Warner merger would produce; (3) uncertainty arising 
out of Paramount’s offer that “skewed comparative analysis” between the Warner and Paramount 
proposals; and (4) the timing of Paramount’s offer, which Time argued was ostensibly designed to 
frustrate shareholder approval of the Warner transaction. [FN111]  The court held that it could not find 
an absence of good faith on the part of Time’s board in having perceived Paramount’s offer as a threat 
and found that it had acted on a sufficiently informed basis. [FN112] 
 
  Turning its attention to Unocal’s second inquiry, the court asserted that  “[t]he obvious requisite to 
determining the reasonableness of a defensive action is a clear identification of the nature of the threat.” 
[FN113]  It then affirmed the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that Time’s restructuring of the Time-
Warner deal was a reasonably proportionate response to the board’s perception of Paramount’s offer as a 
threat. [FN114]  The court also found that Time’s response to Paramount’s offer “was not aimed at 
‘cramming down’ on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the 
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carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form.  Thus, the response was reasonably 
related to the threat.” [FN115]  The court noted that nothing precluded Paramount from targeting the 
combined Time-Warner entity after the consummation of the merger as further *448 grounds supporting 
the proportionality of Time’s response. [FN116]  The Supreme Court’s deferential application of Unocal 
in this case spawned a wealth of criticism labeling the court’s acceptance of Time’s “corporate culture 
defense” as the “just say no defense,” meaning that corporate boards could more or less rebuff any 
unwelcome offer with ubiquitous and universally available justifications. [FN117] 
 
  4. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 
 
  After Paramount failed in its attempt to acquire Time, [FN118] Paramount entered into a strategic 
alliance with Viacom, Inc. (Viacom) [FN119] in spite of inquiries from QVC Network, Inc. (QVC) 
about its possible interest in the company. [FN120]  The merger agreement between Paramount and 
Viacom provided that Paramount would merge with and into Viacom resulting in the emergence of 
Viacom’s CEO as the controlling shareholder of the combined entity. [FN121]  The agreement also 
contained three defensive provisions, all of which were designed to inhibit competing acquirors like 
QVC from succeeding. [FN122]  The first defensive measure was a no-shop provision, which limited 
Paramount’s ability to deal with other potential acquirors. [FN123]  The second provision contained a 
termination fee that obligated Paramount to pay Viacom $100 *449 million in the event that the deal 
failed to be consummated. [FN124]  The third and “most significant deterrent device” was a stock 
option agreement in which Viacom received an option to purchase nearly twenty percent of Paramount’s 
outstanding stock at a fixed price should any number of triggering events come to bear. [FN125] 
 
  At issue between the parties in this case was whether the proposed Paramount-Viacom transaction 
constituted a sale of control within the meaning of Revlon. [FN126]  The Supreme Court agreed with the 
Court of Chancery’s finding that, indeed, the transaction involved a change in control implicating 
Revlon even though it appeared as if Paramount’s actions were a strategic merger and not a sale. 
[FN127] 
 
  Unlike Time, where the court found Revlon to be inapplicable on the basis that Time’s board was 
simply seeing through a preexisting strategic plan, the court in QVC held that “the effect of the Viacom-
Paramount transaction, if consummated, [would have been] to shift control of Paramount from the 
public stockholders to a controlling stockholder, Viacom.” [FN128]  Accordingly, the court classified 
the transaction as a sale of control notwithstanding that it was accomplished through a merger and held 
Revlon applicable. [FN129] 
 
  The court next turned to its assessment of the Paramount board’s decision to merge with Viacom and 
the defensive measures incorporated into the merger agreement. [FN130]  Finding that the board had 
“[given] insufficient attention to the potential consequences of the defensive measures demanded by 
Viacom,” [FN131] the court concluded that the stock option agreement contained “a number of unusual 
and potentially ‘draconian’ provisions.” [FN132]  With respect to the termination fee, the court found 
that while such a device was not per se unreasonable, the $100 million contingency*450 did not enhance 
Paramount’s attractiveness to outside bidders, especially when coupled with the harshness of the stock 
option agreement. [FN133]  The court concluded that the board’s defensive actions were impermissibly 
disproportionate because they “inhibited the Paramount Board’s ability to negotiate with other potential 
bidders, particularly QVC which had already expressed an interest in Paramount.” [FN134]  Thus, the 
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Supreme Court in QVC appeared to back off of the lenient review that it had exhibited in Time.  This 
apparent retreat, however, was short-lived as demonstrated below. 
 
C. Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. 
 
  Ten years after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited and expanded upon the Unocal doctrine 
in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. [FN135] In Unitrin, American General Corp. (American) 
proposed a cash for stock merger transaction with Unitrin, Inc. (Unitrin) in which American offered to 
buy all of Unitrin’s outstanding stock at a thirty percent premium above its market price. [FN136]  
Unitrin’s board heard presentations from financial analysts who opined that American’s offer was 
“financially inadequate,” [FN137] and its attorneys also cautioned that possible antitrust issues might 
arise as a result of the combination contemplated by the proposed deal. [FN138]  After concluding that 
the offer was not in the best interests of its shareholders, Unitrin’s board unanimously voted to reject 
American’s offer [FN139] and further discussed the possibility of adopting a number of defensive 
measures. [FN140] 
 
  Upon receipt of Unitrin’s rejection, American issued a press release announcing its offer. [FN141]  
Viewing American’s announcement as a “hostile act designed to coerce the sale of Unitrin at an 
inadequate price,” [FN142] Unitrin’s board “unanimously approved the poison pill and the proposed 
advance notice bylaw that it had *451 considered previously.” [FN143]  At a subsequent meeting, 
Unitrin’s directors authorized a repurchase program for a considerable percentage of the company’s 
outstanding stock which the board stated would assist non-tendering shareholders in preventing a 
business combination with American. [FN144] 
 
  After granting American’s motion for pendente lite relief, the Court of Chancery certified an 
interlocutory appeal that was accepted by the Supreme Court. [FN145]  The Supreme Court found that 
the Court of Chancery had correctly evaluated the board’s decisions under Unocal, having determined 
that “the Board perceived American General’s Offer as a threat and adopted the Repurchase Program, 
along with the poison pill and advance notice bylaw, as defensive measures in response to that threat.” 
[FN146]  Having reiterated Unocal’s underlying foundation that corporate boards have an “‘inherent 
conflict of interest’ during contests for corporate control,” [FN147] the court in Unitrin summarized 
Unocal’s two-prong test as follows:  
[B]efore the board is accorded the protection of the business judgment rule, and that 
rule’s concomitant placement of the burden to rebut its presumption on the plaintiff, the 
board must carry its own initial two-part burden: 
 First, a reasonableness test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of 
directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed, and 
 Second, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of 
directors’ defensive response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. [FN148] 
 




  1. Reasonableness Prong 
 
  Unitrin’s board stated that it perceived American’s offer as “dangerous” because of its inadequate price 
and antitrust complications. [FN150]  While the Court of Chancery classified these threats as “mild” 
because of American’s supposed willingness to negotiate, it nevertheless determined that the board had 
reasonably concluded that American’s offer posed a threat to Unitrin’s shareholders and thus had 
satisfied the first prong of analysis. [FN151] The Supreme Court took no issue with this finding, instead 
focusing its attention on the proportionality of the defensive measures implemented by Unitrin’s board 
in response. [FN152] 
 
  2. Proportionality Prong 
 
  The Court of Chancery examined each of the board’s defensive responses to American’s proposal 
separately. [FN153]  After finding that the board had reasonably perceived American’s premium offer to 
be inadequate, the court held that the “poison pill [was] . . . a proportionate defensive response to protect 
its stockholders from . . . [the] ‘low ball’ bid.” [FN154]  The Court of Chancery reached a different 
result, however, with respect to the board’s implementation of the repurchase program. [FN155] 
 
  The Court of Chancery found that Unitrin’s repurchase program was a disproportionate response to 
American’s threat based on two factual findings. [FN156]  First, the court found that the repurchase 
program was not “‘necessary”‘ for protecting Unitrin’s stockholders from American’s “‘low ball”‘ 
negotiating *453 strategy. [FN157]  Second, it found that the board’s strategy was designed to reserve 
for itself the ultimate decision of whether to merge with American. [FN158]  The latter finding was 
reached by the Court of Chancery in large part due to its conclusion that not participating in the 
repurchase program would increase the Unitrin directors’ holdings from 23% to as much as 28% of the 
company’s stock. [FN159] Assuming that 90% of Unitrin’s shareholders voted in a proxy contest which 
was opposed by the 28% block held by the company’s management, American, a 14.9% shareholder, 
would have had to carry approximately 65% of the remaining shareholders in order to replace Unitrin’s 
directors and nearly 75% in order to successfully proceed with the merger. [FN160]  The Court of 
Chancery concluded that Unitrin’s adoption of the repurchase program made a proxy contest a 
“‘theoretical’ possibility that American General could not realistically pursue.” [FN161]  From that 
reasoning, the court found that the measure was a necessarily disproportionate and unacceptable 
response because it foreclosed as a practical matter American’s ability to “proxy around” the board’s 
defensive impediments by electing directors of its own. [FN162] 
 
  After a brief, yet thorough, discussion of Delaware’s purported assiduousness regarding board 
decisions interfering with the shareholder franchise, [FN163] the Supreme Court in Unitrin turned to its 
review of the Court of Chancery’s decision enjoining the board’s repurchase program as a 
disproportionate response to the threats accompanying American’s offer. [FN164]  The Supreme Court 
found that notwithstanding the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the repurchase program provided 
Unitrin’s shareholder directors with a practical veto over American’s proposals, a proxy contest 
remained a “viable” option for American. [FN165]  Finding that there was no record to support the 
Court of Chancery’s *454 determination that Unitrin’s shareholder directors would reject an excellent 
offer out of a desire to protect their directorships, [FN166]  Delaware’s high court took issue with the 





  Quoting Time, the court stated that “‘[t]he obvious requisite to determining the reasonableness of a 
defensive action is a clear identification of the nature of the threat.”‘ [FN168]  It then identified three 
generally recognized types of accepted threats: (1) opportunity loss, [FN169] (2) structural coercion, 
[FN170] and (3) substantive coercion. [FN171]  The court categorized American’s threat to Unitrin as a 
form of substantive coercion insofar as Unitrin’s board feared that the company’s shareholders might 
accept American’s offer out of “ignorance or mistaken belief” of their assessment of its inadequacy. 
[FN172] 
 
  *455 The Supreme Court then stated that Unocal, as expounded by its progeny, warranted an inquiry 
into whether the repurchase program, coupled with the poison pill, was impermissibly draconian (i.e., 
coercive or preclusive) and, if not, whether it fell within a “‘range of reasonableness.”‘ [FN173] 
 
  The court reasoned that the mere fact that a self-tender offer by a company may “thwart” a hostile bid 
does not render such an offer inherently coercive. [FN174]  Furthermore, a nondiscriminatory self-
tender offer “does not necessarily preclude future bids or proxy contests by stockholders who decline to 
participate in the repurchase.” [FN175]  Because the repurchase program at issue in Unitrin was 
available to all shareholders who were free to sell or refrain from selling, the Supreme Court held that 
the repurchase program was not coercive. [FN176] 
 
  The court next inquired into whether the repurchase program, [FN177] in light of the poison pill, was 
impermissibly preclusive.  It began by reiterating its earlier conclusion that a proxy contest remained 
theoretically available to American even in the event that the repurchase program was fully carried out 
by Unitrin’s board. [FN178]  From this premise, the court, citing Unocal, stated that “[i]f the 
stockholders of Unitrin are ‘displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
corporate democracy’ remain available as a viable alternative to turn the Board out in a proxy contest.” 
[FN179]  In other words, the Supreme Court emphasized its belief as to the ability of Unitrin’s 
shareholders to exercise their franchise via a proxy contest as central to its finding of an absence of 
preclusion.  The court remanded to the Court of Chancery the ultimate issue of deciding whether the 
adoption of the repurchase program, when the poison pill had already been in place, was preclusive and, 
if not, whether it circumscribed the range of reasonableness threshold articulated in QVC. [FN180] 
 
*456 D. Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 
 
  As demonstrated above, Delaware courts applying Unocal have been quite deferential in their review 
of defensive measures by boards responding to hostile takeovers. [FN181]  One supposed exception 
appears to have been in response to board action aimed at impeding an acquiror’s ability to wage a 
successful proxy contest to replace incumbent directors via the franchise.  As stated by the Supreme 
Court, Delaware courts “ha[ve] been and remain [ ] assiduous in [their] concern about defensive actions 
designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders.” [FN182] This 
Part examines a decision by the Court of Chancery centering on board action designed to restrict the free 
exercise of the shareholders’ right to elect directors via the voting process. 
 
  In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., [FN183] Delaware’s Court of Chancery examined the 
sustainability of defensive measures aimed at frustrating the shareholder franchise.  Blasius Industries, 
Inc. (Blasius), a minority shareholder of Atlas Corp. (Atlas), proposed that Atlas effectuate a leveraged 
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restructuring of the corporation that would facilitate a large one-time cash dividend to its shareholders. 
[FN184]  Following a meeting between representatives from the two companies, Atlas’ representatives 
initially viewed the proposal as infeasible. [FN185] 
 
  After attempts for further meetings by Blasius were rebuffed by Atlas, Blasius delivered to Atlas a 
signed written consent that would have, among other things, “amend[ed] the Atlas bylaws to . . . expand 
the size of the board from seven to fifteen members--the maximum number under Atlas’ charter, and . . . 
elect[ed] eight named persons to fill the new directorships.” [FN186]  Viewing Blasius’ solicitation as 
“an attempt to take control of the Company,” Atlas’ board amended the company’s bylaws to increase 
its size by two directors and appointed two individuals to fill the newly created positions. [FN187]  This, 
of course, ensured that even if Blasius succeeded in its proxy solicitation, it would have been able to 
appoint only seven of Atlas’ fifteen directors.  Blasius responded *457 by filing suit to reverse these 
actions. [FN188] 
 
  The record revealed that by increasing the size of Atlas’ board, the present directors assured “that they 
were thereby precluding the holders of a majority of the Company’s shares from placing a majority of 
new directors on the board through Blasius’ consent solicitation.” [FN189]  The Court of Chancery 
placed heavy emphasis on the fact that Atlas’ board was “principally motivated” by the intent to 
frustrate Blasius’ proxy solicitation and to prevent Blasius from electing a majority of new board 
members. [FN190]  Stated differently, the court found that Atlas’ addition of two directors to its board 
precluded Blasius from electing a majority of directors, which, as a practical matter, impeded it from 
going forward with its restructuring proposal. [FN191] 
 
  Chancellor Allen stated that boards of directors may take defensive actions having the effect of 
defeating a threatened change in corporate control “when those steps are taken advisedly, in good faith 
pursuit of a corporate interest, and are reasonable in relation to a threat to legitimate corporate interests 
posed by the proposed change in control.” [FN192]  The court then discussed why the traditional 
business judgment rule did not apply to defensive decisions aimed at interfering with the shareholder 
franchise, *458 even if taken with due care and in good faith. [FN193] 
 
  After commenting that “[t]he shareholder franchise [was] the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests,” [FN194] the Chancellor surmised that “[a]ction designed 
principally to interfere with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board 
and a shareholder majority.” [FN195]  Having concluded that board decisions designed to displace the 
shareholders’ right to vote could not be reviewed under the traditional business judgment rule, [FN196] 
the Court of Chancery discussed its refusal to apply a per se rule invalidating all board actions primarily 
intended to frustrate the shareholder franchise. [FN197]  The court stated that the Atlas board’s only 
justification for its actions was that “[it knew] better than the shareholders what [was] in the 
corporation’s best interest.” [FN198]  This rationale was quickly dismissed by the court as “irrelevant” 
when the defensive measure in question centered on the ability of shareholders to affect the composition 
of a company’s board of directors. [FN199]  Despite the board’s good faith belief that Blasius’ proposal 
was detrimental to the interests of Atlas and its shareholders, [FN200] the court opined that the board’s 
defensive actions *459 should have been channeled in alternative directions (e.g., informing 
shareholders of their views with the hopes of persuading them to reject the proposal). [FN201] “But 
there is a vast difference,” wrote the court, “between expending corporate funds to inform the electorate 
and exercising power for the primary purpose of foreclosing effective shareholder action.” [FN202]  
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Hence, the court concluded that board action “done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of 
stockholder voting power . . . . [requires] the board [to] bear [ ] the heavy burden of demonstrating a 
compelling justification for such action.” [FN203]  Working from this framework, the Chancellor found 
that because the board’s actions effectively deprived Atlas’ shareholders of the opportunity to decide for 
themselves the success of Blasius’ action, the board, even if acting in good faith, breached the duty of 
loyalty it owed to the company’s shareholders. [FN204] 
 
  While the “basic legal tenets” of the Court of Chancery’s decision in Blasius have been accepted by the 
Supreme Court, [FN205] its holding has been limited considerably based on the facts of that case. 
[FN206] Specifically, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stroud v. Grace [FN207] held that Unocal applied 
to any defensive measure touching upon issues of control, irrespective of whether the measure in 
question implicated voting rights. [FN208]  The court in Stroud stated that in evaluating cases where 
board action touches upon the shareholder voting process, a court must not ignore Blasius *460 but must 
“recognize the special import of protecting the shareholders’ franchise within Unocal’s requirement that 
any defensive measure must be proportionate and ‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”‘ [FN209]  
The Supreme Court in Stroud concluded that a “board’s unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure 
touching ‘upon issues of control’ that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect 
under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a ‘compelling justification.”‘ [FN210]  This 
pronouncement notwithstanding, it remains unclear as to when Blasius’ compelling justification test 
must be used within the framework of the Unocal doctrine, and under which circumstances it should be 




Chesapeake as a Model for Review 
  In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, [FN212] the Court of Chancery tackled the interrelationship between 
the Unocal and Blasius standards of review and, in the process, questioned the legitimacy of 
“substantive coercion” as a basis for justifying defensive responses to hostile bids. [FN213]  This Part 
analyzes the claims of the parties in Chesapeake and the complexity that necessarily accompanies a 
court’s decision to apply either of the two aforementioned standards of review. 
 
  Chesapeake involved two corporations in the specialty packing industry, each having similar strategic 
interests in acquiring the other. [FN214] Following Shorewood Packing Corporation’s (Shorewood) 
acquisition of a small percentage of Chesapeake Corporation’s (Chesapeake) stock, Shorewood’s CEO 
and Chairman, Marc Shore, initiated two meetings with Thomas H. Johnson, Chesapeake’s CEO, that 
“went nowhere.” [FN215]  After obtaining the approval of Shorewood’s board, Shore informed Johnson 
of his company’s intention to acquire Chesapeake for a forty-one percent premium over the company’s 
market price. [FN216]  Johnson responded *461 that his company was not for sale [FN217] and 
Chesapeake’s board unanimously rejected Shorewood’s offer as inadequate. [FN218] 
 
  At a subsequent meeting between Johnson and Shore, Johnson expressed Chesapeake’s interest in 
acquiring all of Shorewood’s shares at a forty percent premium [FN219] and cautioned Shore that 
Chesapeake was virtually takeover proof. [FN220]  Shorewood’s board viewed the offer as so grossly 
inadequate that it did not seek additional financial advice. [FN221]  The board then met by phone to 
consider a host of defensive bylaw changes, [FN222] the most controversial of which was a proposed 
supermajority bylaw amendment requirement that would have made it significantly more difficult for 
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insurgents to eliminate, among other things, the company’s staggered board structure. [FN223]  
Shorewood’s directors identified price inadequacy and substantive coercion as the two threats posed by 
Chesapeake’s offer warranting the adoption of these defensive measures. [FN224] 
 
  *462 Undeterred, “Chesapeake commenced a tender offer for all the shares of Shorewood . . . [and] 
indicated that it intended to acquire any Shorewood shares remaining after closing the tender offer at the 
same price in a back end merger.” [FN225]  Chesapeake also initiated a proxy solicitation aimed at 
circumventing Shorewood’s poison pill and amending Shorewood’s bylaws to remove the company’s 
staggered board structure and unseat the present board of directors. [FN226]  That same day, 
Chesapeake sought an injunction by the Court of Chancery enjoining the Shorewood board’s adoption of 
the defensive bylaws. [FN227] 
 
  Shorewood’s directors challenged Chesapeake’s tender offer as inadequate in price and on the basis 
that it posed the risk of stockholder confusion. [FN228]  Shorewood also countered Chesapeake’s proxy 
solicitation with one of its own that identified all of the issues that the board feared its stockholders 
might overlook in contemplating Chesapeake’s offer. [FN229] One week before the case was scheduled 
to begin and after less than 1% of Shorewood’s shareholders had tendered their shares to Chesapeake, 
Shorewood’s board reduced the supermajority bylaw’s voting provision from 66 2/3 % to 60%. [FN230] 
 
  At trial, Chesapeake sought a declaration that the bylaw provision was  “invalid because [it] was 
intended to and ha[d] the effect of disenfranchising Chesapeake and precluding it from conducting a 
successful Consent Solicitation.” [FN231]  Not surprisingly, Chesapeake and Shorewood disagreed over 
whether the Blasius *463 or Unocal standard of review applied. [FN232]  While Chesapeake advocated 
the applicability of Blasius’ “compelling justification” standard, arguing that the board’s “primary 
purpose in adopting the Supermajority Bylaw was to interfere with or impede the exercise of the 
shareholder franchise,” [FN233] Shorewood argued that Unocal’s two-prong inquiry was the governing 
standard because its decision to adopt the bylaw was a defensive one made in response to Chesapeake’s 
hostile bid. [FN234]  Cognizant of Blasius’ exacting standard, the court recognized the reality that 
“whether it applies comes close to being outcome-determinative in and of itself.” [FN235] 
 
  The court then embarked on a detailed discussion of the interrelationship between Blasius and Unocal. 
[FN236]  Addressed by the court in Chesapeake was the lack of clarity in Delaware caselaw as to 
whether the Unocal doctrine operated independently of Blasius or whether Blasius’ compelling 
justification showing should be merged into Unocal’s proportionality prong for defensive actions 
touching upon the shareholder voting process. [FN237]  Based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Stroud and Unitrin, the Court of Chancery concluded that Unocal was the proper standard for assessing 
the board’s adoption of the supermajority bylaw [FN238] and reasoned that to the extent that the bylaw 
was adopted for the “primary purpose” of interfering with the shareholder franchise, the bylaw could not 
survive review under Unocal absent a compelling justification. [FN239] 
 
  The court began its analysis by critiquing the threat of substantive coercion, [FN240] noting that the 
ubiquity of the threat in this context “without a serious examination of the legitimacy of that defense 
would undercut the purposes the Unocal standard of review was established to serve.” [FN241]  It next 
turned to the inconsistency *464 of Shorewood’s claims. Shorewood first argued that Chesapeake’s 
offer posed the threat of substantive coercion because of the risk that its shareholders might not 
understand the inadequacy of the acquiror’s bid. [FN242]  That assertion, however, was belied by 
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Shorewood’s attempt to justify its actions as not preclusive on the basis that its shareholders were 
sophisticated ones who could always come out in force to “proxy around” the company’s defenses. 
[FN243] 
 
  While the Court of Chancery found sufficient evidence substantiating the price inadequacy threat relied 
on by Shorewood’s board, [FN244] the court found the directors’ substantive coercion threat to be 
unsupported. [FN245] The court noted that initial Shorewood board meetings were “devoid” of any 
mention of that threat. [FN246]  More fundamentally, because Shorewood’s directors admitted that they 
had disseminated all of the business information that they believed the company’s shareholders could 
not understand, “[t]he most the . . . directors [were] able to credibly say [was] that stockholders [would] 
never understand the relevant information as deeply as directors do.” [FN247]  In rejecting this threat, 
the court also relied on the fact that eighty percent of Shorewood’s *465 stock was held by management 
and institutional investors and thus, the board would presumably have been able to dispel any 
misperceptions or confusion. [FN248] 
 
  While Shorewood’s directors reduced the supermajority bylaw’s voting provision from 66 2/3 % to 
60%, “[t]he board . . . never considered whether it was reasonably practicable for Chesapeake or any 
other third party opposed by the board to win under these rules” [FN249] or “whether Chesapeake’s lack 
of success in soliciting tenders should lead it to reconsider whether any supermajority voting 
requirement was needed.” [FN250]  Thus, on the day Shorewood’s board adopted “the final 
Supermajority Bylaw, the board never assessed whether the supposed threat of confusion still existed.” 
[FN251] 
 
  In discerning whether the supermajority bylaw was a proportionate and non- preclusive response, the 
court noted that while Unitrin required the defendant- board members to show “that it [was] 
‘realistically’ attainable for Chesapeake to prevail in [the] consent solicitation to amend the Shorewood 
bylaws,” [FN252] the Shorewood board had “simply made no judgment” as to this inquiry. [FN253]  
The 66 2/3 % supermajority bylaw requirement made it “mathematically impossible” for an acquiror 
like Chesapeake to succeed in a consent solicitation not supported by the Shorewood board assuming a 
90% shareholder turnout. [FN254]  With respect to the amendment lowering the supermajority bylaw 
requirement to 60%, the court found that the board had, once again, “ignored whether Chesapeake could 
‘realistically’ attain the necessary votes to amend the Shorewood bylaws if the Shorewood board *466 
continued to oppose that endeavor.” [FN255] 
 
  The court likened the requisite disinterested majorities to those of “sham elections in dictatorships” 
[FN256] and noted that “[t]he defendants ha[d] presented no reliable evidence to suggest that 
Chesapeake or any other insurgent could achieve such a high level of support in the face of management 
opposition.” [FN257]  To wit, the court found the supermajority bylaw to be preclusive.  That finding 
notwithstanding, however, the court additionally held that the supermajority bylaw did not fall within a 
range of reasonableness. [FN258] 
 
  The court viewed “[t]he more important proportionality problem [as being] the fact that the 
Supermajority Bylaw [was] an extremely aggressive and overreaching response to a very mild threat.” 
[FN259]  In light of the protective measures already in existence and thus available to Shorewood’s 
board, [FN260] the court found that the board never considered the “less extreme and more 
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proportionate options” of adopting a more “aggressive communications plan” or attempting to negotiate 
with Chesapeake for a higher bid. [FN261] 
 
  Instead, the board adopted a supermajority bylaw that [could] only be surmounted by obtaining over 
eighty-eight percent of the disinterested votes, assuming a ninety percent turnout.  Yet the board has 
been unable to demonstrate that such an outcome can be achieved.  Ironically, its primary argument in 
that regard is that Shorewood’s stockholder base is overwhelmingly comprised of sophisticated and 
highly mobilized stockholders who will turn *467 out in droves.  These, of course, are the very same 
stockholders who are, the defendants say, unable to sort out the issues and make a rational judgment for 
themselves. [FN262] 
 
  The court had little trouble concluding that the board had acted outside of a range of reasonableness 
and thus, had failed to meet its Unocal burden. [FN263] 
 
  In distinguishing the case at hand from Unitrin, the Court of Chancery in Chesapeake noted that 
Unitrin emphasized the need to defer to corporate board decisions adopting defensive measures, but “in 
no way suggest[ed] that the court ought to sanction a board’s adoption of very aggressive defensive 
measures when that board ha[d] given little or no consideration to relevant factors and less preclusive 
alternatives.” [FN264] 
 
  The Chesapeake court also invalidated the board’s actions under Blasius.  Finding that the Shorewood 
directors had “clearly acted” to compromise the shareholders’ ability to freely exercise their franchise, 
[FN265] the court found that the board’s belief that it, as opposed to the shareholders, knew better what 
was best for the company “provide[d] no legitimate justification at all.” [FN266]  This, compounded by 
the fact that the dangers presented by Chesapeake’s offer were “mild,” prevented Shorewood’s board 




The Interrelationship Between Unocal and Blasius 
 
  As recognized by Chancellor Allen, “[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy *468 of directorial power rests.” [FN268]  The court in Chesapeake explored the 
extent to which Blasius was “viable as a standard of review independent of Unocal in a case where 
Unocal would otherwise be the [governing] standard of review.” [FN269]  This Article has articulated 
Delaware’s justification for displacing the traditional business judgment rule as the default standard for 
evaluating those situations where the interests of corporate management and shareholders have a 
heightened potential for divergence. [FN270]  In theory, Unocal and its progeny create a takeover 
jurisprudence mindful of the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders” when assessing the fiduciary duties of 
directors implementing defensive measures. [FN271]  In practice, however, one must be suspicious of a 
standard where the “just say no” defenses of corporate culture [FN272] and shareholder mistake 
[FN273] suffice under Unocal’s supposed enhanced scrutiny as justifications for rejecting the offers and 
substantial premiums of unwelcome suitors.  This skepticism, of course, is only made worse by the 




  With respect to defensive actions infringing upon the shareholder franchise, the concerns attributable to 
the judiciary’s deferential application of Unocal are compounded even further.  No time is more critical 
throughout a corporation’s life than when it is the subject of takeover efforts.  While Unocal provides 
that the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the shareholders obligate them to respond proportionately 
to perceived threats, the ultimate decision on matters involving corporate control is one reserved for the 
shareholders as a matter of right. [FN275] 
 
  *469 Unocal acknowledges the omnipresent specter that directors responding to unwelcome bids may 
be acting with entrenchment motives.  Consistent with that, Blasius reflects a recognition that defensive 
measures implicating the shareholders’ voting rights present even greater potential for abuse and 
concern. “‘The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the 
shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.”‘ [FN276]  Accordingly, board actions that shield 
directors from the shareholder electorate are presumptively suspect and must be scrutinized with an eye 
toward the pervasive concerns originally articulated in Unocal and Blasius and subsequently espoused 
by the Supreme Court in Stroud and Unitrin. While these and other opinions contain numerous passages 
indicating that Delaware courts already do this, [FN277] in practice, this has not been the case. 
 
  In Stroud and Unitrin, for example, the Supreme Court purported to infuse Blasius’ “basic legal tenets” 
[FN278] into Unocal’s two-prong inquiry when assessing director action touching upon the shareholder 
franchise.  Recall that Stroud held Unocal applicable in all situations where a board takes defensive 
measures in reaction to a perceived threat irrespective of whether the action touches upon issues of 
control. [FN279]  Stroud sought to reconcile the interrelationship between Blasius and Unocal by 
merging Blasius’ mandate into Unocal’s proportionality inquiry, thereby appearing to stand for the 
principle that “strongly suspect” measures of this sort would pass muster under Unocal only if *470 
mitigated by a compelling justification. [FN280] 
 
  On its face, this coordinated approach seems sufficient for protecting the sanctity of the shareholder 
franchise in a manner consistent with the policy concerns articulated by both the Supreme Court in 
Unocal and the Court of Chancery in Blasius. [FN281]  Indeed, “[i]n application, the ‘preclusiveness’ or 
‘coerciveness’ inquiry under Unocal/Unitrin and the inquiry into the board’s ‘primary purpose’ under 
Blasius, are not easily separable.” [FN282]  The effectiveness of this approach, however, only goes as 
far as the judiciary’s collective willingness to fulfill Unocal’s directive. [FN283]  It is the Supreme 
Court’s failure to apply that doctrine forcefully that fuels this Article’s call for change. [FN284] 
 
  The Court of Chancery observed in Chesapeake that Unitrin “seem[ed] to go even further than Stroud 
in integrating Blasius’ concern over manipulation of the electoral process into the Unocal standard of 
review.” [FN285] Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s bark in Unitrin appears to have been greater than 
its bite.  After espousing notions of the court’s “assiduous[ness] in its concern about defensive actions 
designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders” [FN286] and 
citing to Stroud’s adoption of Blasius’ “‘basis legal tenets,”‘ [FN287] the Supreme Court in Unitrin 
proceeded to assess the target’s adoption of the repurchase program and other defenses without ever 
citing to Blasius or mentioning its compelling justification standard again. [FN288]  This was so in spite 
of the fact that the dissident shareholder *471 in that case would have had to procure the votes of nearly 
sixty-five percent of the company’s non-management shareholders to replace Unitrin’s board and 
roughly seventy-five percent to proceed with its merger plans. [FN289]  It is one thing to state, as the 
Supreme Court did in Stroud, that defensive actions touching upon the shareholder franchise will be 
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assessed under a heightened Unocal standard demanding a compelling justification before they will pass 
muster as reasonably proportionate.  It is quite another for the court, after purportedly merging Blasius’ 
compelling justification standard into the Unocal test, to simply pass over the heightened showing as if it 
was never there. [FN290] 
 
  Even assuming as correct the Supreme Court’s finding in Unitrin that a proxy contest remained a 
“viable” alternative for American, one would think that Blasius’ “basic legal tenets” would have at least 
warranted some discussion by the court considering the large percentage of non-director shareholders 
that the insurgent would have had to carry in order to prevail.  The Court of Chancery in Chesapeake 
noted that the supermajority bylaw in question in that case made it “mathematically impossible” for the 
insurgent to wage a successful proxy contest that was not supported by management.  Does that mean 
that those situations falling somewhere on the spectrum between “viable” and “impossible” will be 
found by courts to pass muster under Unocal?  If management can simply acquire a significant voting 
block in its company (e.g., over twenty-five percent like the directors in Unitrin) and still not be found to 
have precluded an unwelcome bidder from prevailing in a consent contest, the current approach 
advanced by the court in Stroud and Unitrin is not strong enough.  Because Unocal is not being applied 
“with a gimlet eye out for inequitably motivated electoral manipulations or for subjectively well-
intentioned board action that has preclusive or coercive effects,” [FN291] this Article surmises that the 
“Unocal/Unitrin analytical framework [fails to] adequate[ly] capture the voting franchise concerns that 
animated Blasius.” [FN292] 
 
  *472 The policy considerations consistently lauded by the Supreme Court more than justify adherence 
to that court’s purported commitment to protecting the shareholder franchise--if anything, they demand 
it. Unfortunately, it is the reluctance of the courts to protect rigorously the shareholder voting process 
within the framework of Unocal that necessitates a divergent approach from the one currently advanced 
by the court in Stroud. [FN293]  Specifically, the judiciary’s unwillingness to do little more than 
proclaim its “assiduous . . . concern about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate 
democracy by disenfranchising shareholders” begs the question of whether Blasius’ compelling 
justification standard should be bifurcated from Unocal’s two-part showing for assessing those defensive 
actions touching upon the shareholder franchise. 
 
  While this approach is tempting at first blush, the mere act of severing Blasius from Unocal does 
nothing to ensure that courts will opt for that doctrine as opposed to the Unocal one.  Indeed, if 
Delaware courts are diffident as a collective body about applying Unocal with the spirit of Blasius under 
the approach advanced by Stroud, why would they suddenly choose to apply Blasius as a free standing 
test all unto itself?  The answer, this Article submits, is that against the backdrop of Blasius’ current 
“primary purpose” holding, they would not. [FN294]  As such, this Article advocates recalibrating the 
scope of Blasius’ standard of review to envelop those defensive actions implemented by corporate 
boards having a substantial effect upon the ability of shareholders to exercise their franchise freely. 
[FN295] 
 
  *473 It is true that Blasius’ holding has been limited to board actions taken with the “primary purpose” 
of compromising the shareholders’ ability to vote. [FN296]  The defendant directors before the Court of 
Chancery in Blasius, however, did not dispute that they were principally motivated by the desire to 
foreclose the dissident’s ability to elect a majority of the board. [FN297]  Unlike the facts before the 
court in Blasius, “[t]he line between board actions that influence the electoral process in legitimate ways 
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. . . and those that preclude effective stockholder action [in the typical case] is not always luminous.” 
[FN298]  Considering that directors in Delaware are protected from being required to engage in self-
flagellation when faced with the prospect of litigation over allegedly wrongful corporate conduct, 
[FN299] the preliminary threshold for Blasius’ mandate in the majority of cases is even harder to clear.  
The ability of corporate boards, with the assistance of sophisticated counsel and advisors, to craft the 
nuances of most transactions to circumvent Blasius’ current reach only exacerbates this reality. [FN300]  
The exacting primary purpose showing under Blasius, therefore, is, as a practical matter, inherently 
unascertainable for the vast majority of plaintiff--shareholders who are alleged to have been aggrieved in 
this setting. [FN301]  That being said, why *474 should the reach of Blasius’ protective doctrine be 
confined solely to the narrow facts of that case? 
 
  Accepting the stature of the shareholder franchise as the “ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests,” [FN302] few could disagree with Chancellor Allen’s recognition 
that “matters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve consideration[s] not 
present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated power.” [FN303]  In order to give 
teeth to the Supreme Court’s proclamation that the shareholder franchise will be respected as the 
cornerstone of corporate democracy, Blasius’ compelling justification standard must be expanded to 
apply to more situations than just those where a defendant-board admits that it was acting with the 
primary motivation of disenfranchising its shareholders.  After all, “[a]bsent confessions of improper 
purpose, the most important evidence of what a board intended to do is often what effect its actions 
have.” [FN304] 
 
  It is not this Article’s intent to subject defensive measures having a de minimis or tangential impact on 
the voting rights of shareholders to a compellingly stringent review.  Instead, only those defensive 
measures having a “substantial effect” on the shareholder franchise should be assessed under Blasius’ 
demanding test. [FN305]  Assume a scenario similar to the one in Chesapeake but involving a larger and 
more widely traded target in which management owned a smaller percentage of the company’s stock 
and the supermajority bylaw amendment provision required approval by sixty percent of the company’s 
shareholders.  Although the board would be unable to demonstrate that its defensive actions *475 did 
not have an “effect” on the shareholders’ ability to vote freely, one could imagine a court finding that its 
actions did not have a “substantial effect” on the shareholder franchise depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the dissident’s ability to prevail in a proxy contest.  By way of contrast, had this Article’s 
substantial effect test been available at the time of Unitrin, the repurchase program adopted by Unitrin’s 
board would have arguably warranted review under Blasius’ demanding inquiry notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s finding that a successful proxy remained a “viable” possibility for American. 
 
  While Delaware courts have voiced their reluctance to apply Blasius because of its “onerous” burden, 
[FN306] the preeminance of the franchise in Delaware’s corporate governance heirarchy justifies 
subjecting presumptively suspect defensive measures to careful scrutiny.  This Article is cognizant of 
the arguably wide range of defensive measures that its substantial effect approach would reach.  That 
being said, it is this Article’s position that if inherently interested directors are going to implement 
measures substantially compromising the franchise at the time of a corporation’s most important 
transaction, it is better to apply a more exacting standard protecting shareholders than a deferential one 
favoring directors.  After all, if defensive measures substantially impacting the franchise are truly 
necessary for safeguarding the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, who better situated 
than the directors to justify those measures?  In light of the foregoing, therefore, this Article submits that 
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its substantial effect test will better facilitate protections for shareholders in conformity with the 




  The policy concerns underlying this Article’s call for an expanded reading of Blasius for those 
defensive actions having a substantial effect upon the shareholder franchise are consistent with those 
which the Delaware judiciary already purports to acknowledge and accept.  The compelling justification 
threshold of judicial review in Blasius recognizes that directors serve at the behest of shareholders as 
their agents and, to that end, seeks to ensure that directorial actions compromising the shareholders’ 
*476 collective voices in this context will be assessed under a significantly heightened standard of 
review. 
 
  On its face, merging Blasius’ compelling justification standard into the second prong of Unocal, as 
contemplated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stroud, addresses the fundamental concerns 
substantiating Blasius’ standard of review in the first place. [FN308]  The judiciary’s reluctance to apply 
Unocal with the “spirit of Blasius,” however, is where this approach inevitably falls apart. [FN309]  As 
such, this Article has opined that its expanded approach is both warranted and necessary for protecting 
the aforementioned pillars of corporate governance upon which Delaware’s renowned jurisprudence 
rests. [FN310] 
 
  This approach does not foreclose and/or set forth a standard that cannot be met by target boards whose 
defensive actions have a “substantial effect” on the communicative voices of shareholders.  Instead, it 
simply ensures that when suspect measures substantially infringe upon the ability of shareholders to 
control their corporation’s destiny, the inherent conflict of interest concerns that motivated Unocal and 
Blasius will be adequately taken into account and provided for.  This, the Delaware judiciary already 
professes to do. Readjusting Blasius’ reach will empower courts with a more workable framework for 
actually doing so. 
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[FN1]. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, in We, the People: Great Documents of the 
American Nation 482, 484 (Jerome B. Agel ed., 1997). 
 




[FN3]. As of the turn of this century, strategic mergers have become the predominant vehicle for 
effectuating complex business acquisitions.  See Pamela A. Vlahakis, Takeover Law and Practice 2000, 
PLI 799, 809 (Nov. 2000).  By no means, however, has the importance of hostile takeovers diminished.  
To the contrary, powerful companies including IBM, Pfizer, Vodafone, and Bank of New York, made 
hostile bids for competitors at the end of the 1990s.  See id. For a discussion of the different waves of 
hostile takeovers and the current climate of hostile takeover activity in the acquisition market, see infra 
Part I.B. 
 
[FN4]. This Article focuses exclusively on Delaware corporate law.  Delaware has become “the 
dominant choice as state of incorporation for the largest U.S. companies” for reasons including “a 
preference for Delaware law.”  Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061, 1061 (2000) (explaining “the role of the 
Delaware courts as central to Delaware’s dominance of the market for corporate charters”); see also Leo 
Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Forward to 1 R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware 
Law of Corporations and Business Organizations F-1, F-6 (3d ed. 1998) (“The economies of scale 
created by the high volume of corporate litigation in Delaware contribute to an efficient and expert court 
system and bar.”); 1 Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Directors 3 (5th ed. 1998) (“[T]he Delaware court system often is viewed as ‘the Mother Court of 
corporate law.”‘) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), 
rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991)). 
 
[FN5]. See infra Part I.D. (discussing the inherently divided interests of directors in this context and the 
rationale for displacing the traditional business judgment rule as the default standard of judicial 
scrutiny). 
 
[FN6]. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  For a discussion of the landmark  Unocal decision, see infra Part II.A. 
 
[FN7]. See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. Law. 625 (2000). 
 
[FN8]. For a discussion of Unocal and its progeny, see infra Part II. 
 
[FN9]. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 
849 (1995).  Gilson and Black state that:  
Unocal and [its progeny] can be read to suggest that ... review [under that test] is 
primarily a formal, rhetorical instruction rather than a substantive standard of review. On 
this view, the new standard ... serves chiefly to signal judicial concern and to invite 
planners to proceed with their defenses only after constructing a record that demonstrates 
reasonableness and articulates a “threat.”  
Id. (citation omitted).  See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?”  Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 515-16 (1997); 
Mark J. Loewenstein, Unocal Revisited: No Tiger in the Tank, 27 J. Corp. L. 1, 2-4 (2001); Robert B. 
Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in 
Corporate Takeovers, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261, 262 (2001). Moreover, because the Delaware Supreme Court 
has significantly compromised the enhanced level of review for board action touching upon the 
shareholder franchise, this Article opines that Blasius’ threshold showing should be expanded to ensure 
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that suspect measures substantially infringing on the shareholder voting process will be strictly 
scrutinized.  See infra Part IV. 
 
[FN10]. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 
[FN11]. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 
[FN12]. For a discussion of the Blasius decision, see infra Part II.D. 
 
[FN13]. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 66l. 
 
[FN14]. As articulated by the Court of Chancery in Chesapeake, “[b]ecause the [Blasius] test is so 
exacting--akin to that used to determine whether racial classifications are constitutional--whether it 
applies comes close to being outcome-determinative in and of itself.”  Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 319- 20. 
 
[FN15]. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992). 
 
[FN16]. See id. at 92 n.3. 
 
[FN17]. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 
[FN18]. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN19]. More specifically, a takeover is defined as:  
[A]n attempt by a bidder (raider) to acquire control of a subject company  (target) 
through acquisition of some or all of its outstanding shares.  Most commonly, takeover 
bids are made directly to shareholders of the target as a cash tender offer or as an 
exchange offer of raider securities for target stock.  
1 Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts § 1.01[2]  (2002). 
 
[FN20]. See id. 
 
[FN21]. Lipton and Steinberger define “hostile takeovers” as “offer[s] made directly to target 
shareholders, without management approval.”  Id.  They continue:  
The takeover process is fundamentally a process of bargaining and negotiation.  As 
bidders develop new and more aggressive techniques to make any corporation a potential 
target and to increase their ability to consummate the acquisitions they attempt, target 
corporations counter with new defensive techniques designed for the most part to 
increase the bargaining position of the board of directors.  No takeover defense technique 
(other than concentrating the voting securities in friendly hands) has ever made a 
[Delaware] corporation acquisition-proof.  Defensive techniques have, however, 
increased the leverage of the board of directors in finding a better deal.  




[FN22]. For an account of the history and trends of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the United 
States, see generally Malcolm Salter & Wolf Weinhold, Merger Trends and Prospects for the 1980’s 
(1980), excerpted in Gilson & Black, supra note 9, at 12, 12-39. 
 
[FN23]. See Laurence Zuckerman, Shades of the Go-Go 80’s: Takeovers in a Comeback, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 3, 1994, at A1 (observing that “predatory” hostile takeovers dominated acquisition practice in the 
1980s, “when as much as 25 percent of all deals were hostile”).  The heightened takeover activity of the 
1980s was fueled largely by the ready availability of credit and capital that dominated that period.  See 1 
Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Takeover Defense § 1.01, at 1-3 (6th ed. Supp. 2002). 
 
[FN24]. Stanley S. Arkin, Causality in Insider Trading, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1993, at 3. 
 
[FN25]. Fleischer, Jr. & Sussman, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-3. 
 
[FN26]. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 879 (2002). 
 
[FN27]. See John Elsen, The Best of Times, Investment Dealers Digest, Oct. 16, 1995, at 14-15, 
reprinted in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Business Planning for Mergers and Acquisitions 19-20 (1997) 
(stating that “[t]he takeover is now considered somewhat of a model for hostile bids, with its blowout 
initial offer to keep out potential rivals, followed by a modest sweetener to make the deal friendly”). 
 
[FN28]. See Fleisher, Jr. & Sussman, supra note 23, § 5.01, at 5-5. 
 
[FN29]. See id. § 5.01[B][1], at 5-7 to 5-9. 
 
[FN30]. See id. 
 
[FN31]. See id. 
 
[FN32]. See id. § 5.02[B][1], at 5-21 to 5-23. 
 
[FN33]. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2000) (“An annual meeting of stockholders shall be held 
for the election of directors. ...”); see also Balotti & Finkelstein, supra note 4, § 4.6, at 4-16 (“[T]he 
general rule is that the term of a director is one year unless the board is classified by having staggered 
terms pursuant to Section 141(d) of the General Corporation Law.”). 
 
[FN34]. See Del. Code Ann. tit., 8 § 141(d) (2000). 
 
[FN35]. See id.; see also Balotti & Finkelstein, supra note 4, § 4.6, at 4-16 to 4-17. 
 
[FN36]. As discussed previously, one of the few options available for an acquiror proceeding without 
the consent of current management is to “proxy around” the target’s board with the hope of gaining 
control and appointing directors more favorable to the intended transaction.  As such, classified boards 





[FN37]. For a comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the business judgment rule, see generally Block 
et al., supra note 4, at 18-104. 
 
[FN38]. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing 8 Del. Code Ann. tit., 8 § 141(a) 
(2000)), overruled on other grounds Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 
[FN39]. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341  (Del. 1987) (citing Aronson, 
473 A.2d at 812).  When a court invokes the business judgment rule, it assesses the actions of corporate 
management not by looking at the outcome of a given decision, but instead with an eye toward the 
manner and procedure in which the decision at issue was made.  See Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 (Del. 1994); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
720 (Del. 1971). In other words, the substance of board action under the traditional business judgment 
rule is virtually immune from second-guessing by courts after the fact.  See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45 
n.17. 
 
[FN40]. William A. Klein & J. Mark Ramseyer, Business Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, 
Partnerships, and Corporations 323, 323 (3d ed. 1997). 
 
[FN41]. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162  (Del. 1995); Paramount, 637 
A.2d at 45 n.17; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12. 
 
[FN42]. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162; see also In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 
[FN43]. See Block et al., supra note 4, at 954; see also Fleischer, Jr. & Sussman, supra note 23, § 3.01, 
at 3-6 (“The traditional business judgment rule has been modified in Delaware ... as it applies to 
defensive actions by a target board to resist an unsolicited offer and to board actions in the environment 
of a sale of control of the company.”). 
 
[FN44]. The court in Unocal recognized that “[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be 
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.”  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 
(Del. 1985).  It has become generally recognized that the “omnipresent specter” motivating the court in 
Unocal was entrenchment. See infra note 59. 
 
[FN45]. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. 
 
[FN46]. See id. 
 
[FN47]. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN48]. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.  The court in Unocal stated that the directors could satisfy the 
reasonableness prong by making a showing of good faith and conducting a reasonable investigation.  
See id.  “Furthermore,” continued the court, “such proof is materially enhanced ... by the approval of a 
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board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the 
foregoing standards.”  Id.  The Delaware Supreme Court noted a number of examples of coercive threats 
which included “inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, 
the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders ... the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality 




[FN50]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (“The common law pronouncement in  Unocal of enhanced 
judicial scrutiny, as a threshold or condition precedent to an application of the traditional business 
judgment rule, is now well known.”). 
 
[FN51]. A selective tender offer involves an offer to purchase stock from a restricted class of the target’s 
shareholders.  In a selective self-tender offer, therefore, a company excludes certain shareholders from 
its offer to repurchase its securities.  For a discussion of Unocal’s selective self-tender offer, see infra 
text accompanying notes 66-71. 
 
[FN52]. For a discussion of the two-tier front-loaded tender offer initiated by Mesa, see infra text 
accompanying notes 61-65. 
 
[FN53]. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. 
 
[FN54]. Id.  Ironically, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) agreed with the Court of 
Chancery’s bright line rejection of discriminatory self-tender offers, having amended its rules to prohibit 
issuer tender offers other than those available to all shareholders.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e- 4(f)(8) 
(2000). 
 
[FN55]. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953. 
 
[FN56]. Id.  As support for this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the “large reservoir of 
authority” granted to boards of directors which derive their powers from the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.  See id. (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2000)).  The court later stated that “the 
board’s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, 
which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of the source.”  Id. at 954.  
This conclusion allowed the court to find that while Unocal’s board still owed Mesa, a minority 
shareholder, the cornerstone duties of due care, good faith, and loyalty, the “destructive threat that 
Mesa’s tender offer was perceived to pose ... [triggered] a supervening duty to protect the corporate 
enterprise, which includes the other shareholders, from threatened harm.”  Id. at 958. 
 
[FN57]. See id. at 954. 
 
[FN58]. See id.  The court reasoned:  
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether 
the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.  In that respect a 
board’s duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions 
should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of 
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business judgment.  There are, however, caveats to a proper exercise of this function.  
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders [in hostile settings], 
there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 
[FN59]. See id.  While Unocal itself fails to address precisely why directors have an inherent conflict of 
interest in this setting, extensive commentary and subsequent caselaw make clear that the omnipresent 
concern underlying the court’s decision in that case was management entrenchment.  See J. Travis 
Laster, Exorcizing the Omnipresent Specter: The Impact of Substantial Equity Ownership by Outside 
Directors on Unocal Analysis, 55 Bus. Law. 109, 112-16 (1999).  The Unocal test places the burden on 
defendant directors to show that they acted reasonably in response to perceived threats. See Unocal, 493 
A.2d at 955.  Recall that because the business judgment rule presumes that management decisions are 
made on an informed basis and in good faith, the rule places the burden on plaintiffs to rebut that 
presumption.  See supra Part I.D.  The enhanced scrutiny of Unocal, therefore, defers this presumption 
and flips the initial burden of persuasion to defendants. 
 
[FN60]. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; see also supra text accompanying notes 48-49 (quoting Unocal’s 
pronouncement of its two-prong standard). 
 
[FN61]. The court found that “the threat posed was viewed by the Unocal board as a grossly inadequate 
two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail.”  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. 
 
[FN62]. See id. 
 








[FN67]. See id. 
 
[FN68]. See id. 
 
[FN69]. See id.  The court defined the term greenmail as “the practice of buying out a takeover bidder’s 
stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to prevent the takeover.”  Id. at 
n.13. 
 






[FN72]. See id. at 957 (“If the board of directors is disinterested, has acted in good faith and with due 
care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion will be upheld as a proper exercise of business 
judgment.”).  For a more detailed discussion of the business judgment rule, see supra Part I.D. While 
outside its scope, this Article acknowledges the scholarly debate as to whether applying the business 
judgment rule after Unocal’s two-part showing is necessary.  See William T. Allen et al., Function Over 
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 1287, 1311 
(2001) (“[O]nce the target company board’s defensive actions are found to satisfy or fail the Unocal 
[sic] test, any further judicial review of those actions under the business judgment [rule] is analytically 
and functionally unnecessary.”). 
 
[FN73]. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. 
 
[FN74]. The depiction of caselaw that follows in this Part is intended to serve two purposes.  First, these 
cases illustrate how courts apply Unocal’s two-part showing in practice when faced with different 
factual threats and settings.  Second, these cases identify the pragmatic reasons underlying the criticism 
that Unocal has been watered down to that of a dressed up business judgment rule. 
 
[FN75]. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 
[FN76]. See id. at 1348 n.2.  For a discussion of poison pills, see supra Part I.C.1. 
 
[FN77]. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.  More specifically, Household’s minutes revealed that its lawyer had 
recommended the defensive measure:  
[B]ased on his understanding that the Board was concerned about the increasing 
frequency of ‘bust-up’ takeovers, the increasing takeover activity in the financial service 
industry, ... and the possible adverse effect this type of activity could have on employees 
and others concerned with and vital to the continuing successful operation of Household 
even in the absence of any actual bust-up takeover attempt.  
Id. at 1349. 
 
[FN78]. See id. at 1353. 
 
[FN79]. See id. at 1356. 
 




[FN82]. See id. 
 
[FN83]. See id. 
 
[FN84]. See id. 
 




[FN86]. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995)  (summarizing the holding of 
the court in Moran). 
 
[FN87]. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. 
 
[FN88]. Id.  The court viewed the actual adoption of the poison pill as having little effect on the 
structure of the corporation.  See id.  As stated by the court, “[t]he Board does not now have unfettered 
discretion in refusing to redeem the Rights.  The Board has no more discretion in refusing to redeem the 
Rights than it does in enacting any defensive mechanism.”  Id. 
 
[FN89]. See id. at 1357. 
 
[FN90]. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 
[FN91]. See id. at 176-79. 
 
[FN92]. See id. at 180-81.  The threat relied on by Revlon’s board was that Pantry Pride’s offer was 
“grossly inadequate.”  Id. at 181. 
 




[FN95]. See id. (stating that the board “no longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or 
to the stockholders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. ... The directors’ role changed from 
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price from the 
stockholders at a sale of the company”). 
 
[FN96]. See id.  In a typical lock-up transaction, the target issues considerable amounts of stock or 
contingent stock rights cheaply to a friendly third party (in this case Forstmann).  See id. at 183.  This is 
designed to make the acquisition more difficult and expensive for would-be acquirors because more 
shares have to be procured.  See id. 
 
[FN97]. See id.  (“[T]he result of the lock-up was not to foster bidding, but to destroy it [to the detriment 
of Pantry Pride].”). 
 
[FN98]. See id. at 184.  A no-shop clause is a common provision contained in an acquisition agreement 
that deters targets from seeking other bids for a specified period of time.  See Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re 
Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97 (Del. Ch. 1999).  An acquiror will often negotiate this type of agreement to 
restrict a target’s ability to entertain other offers to the exclusion of its intended one.  See id. 
 
[FN99]. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.  The court continued, stating that in certain circumstances, favoritism 
of a white knight might yield the highest bid for a company’s shareholders once a sale has become 
inevitable, “but when bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes 
inevitable, the directors cannot fulfil their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with contending 




[FN100]. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 
[FN101]. See id. at 1146. 
 
[FN102]. See id. 
 




[FN105]. At the time of Paramount’s $175 offer, Time’s shares were trading at $126 per share.  See id.  
The market value of Time’s stock skyrocketed to $170 per share less than a day after Paramount’s 
announcement.  See id. 
 
[FN106]. See id. 
 
[FN107]. Id. at 1148. 
 
[FN108]. See id. at 1149.  Recall that just prior to Paramount’s opening offer of $175 per share, Time’s 
stock was trading at $126 per share. See id. at 1147. 
 
[FN109]. See id. 
 
[FN110]. The Supreme Court rejected Paramount’s claim that Revlon applied because of the absence of 
any evidence supporting the conclusion that Time and Warner’s deal put the company up for sale.  See 
id. at 1149-50. The court identified two circumstances where Revlon was implicated: first, where “a 
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization 
involving a clear break-up of the company”; and second, “where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target 
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the 
company.”  Id. at 1150.  The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that Time’s adoption of 
“structural safety devices alone [did] not trigger Revlon” but was instead subject to analysis under 
Unocal.  See id. at 1151. 
 
[FN111]. See id. at 1153. 
 
[FN112]. See id. at 1154. 
 
[FN113]. Id.  The court then quoted the Court of Chancery’s statement that this inquiry “‘requires an 
evaluation of the importance of the corporate objective threatened; alternative methods of protecting that 
objective; impacts of the ‘defensive’ action, and other relevant factors.”‘  Id. (quoting Chancellor Allen 
below). 
 






[FN116]. See id.  As a practical matter, however, the combination of Time and Warner foreclosed 
Paramount’s ability to go forward with its strategic desire to acquire Time alone.  Even assuming that 
the acquisition of the combined Time-Warner entity remained an attractive option for Paramount, the 
court did not address whether the shear enormity of the merged corporation precluded a company like 
Paramount from succeeding. 
 
[FN117]. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on 
the Board’s Power to “Just Say No”, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 999 (1999); Neil C. Rifkind, Note, Should 
Uninformed Shareholders be a Threat Justifying Defensive Action by Target Directors in Delaware?: 
“Just Say No”: After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 105 (1998); Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes 
Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on 
Strategic Mergers, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 609 (1995); Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender 
Offers and the “Nancy Reagan Defense”: May Boards “Just Say No” ? Should They be Allowed To?, 15 
Del. J. Corp. L. 377 (1990); see also supra note 9. 
 
[FN118]. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 
[FN119]. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994). 
 
[FN120]. See id. at 38. 
 
[FN121]. See id. at 43. 
 
[FN122]. Id. at 39. 
 
[FN123]. See id. 
 
[FN124]. See id. 
 
[FN125]. See id.  The termination fee required Paramount to pay Viacom  $100 million if “(a) 
Paramount terminated the Original Merger Agreement because of a competing transaction; (b) 
Paramount’s stockholders did not approve the merger; or (c) the Paramount Board recommended a 
competing transaction.” Id. at 39. 
 
[FN126]. See id. at 43-44. 
 
[FN127]. See id. 
 
[FN128]. Id. at 48. 
 
[FN129]. See id. 
 












[FN135]. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN136]. Id. at 1368. 
 
[FN137]. Id. at 1369. 
 
[FN138]. See id. 
 
[FN139]. See id. 
 
[FN140]. See id. 
 






[FN144]. See id. 
 
[FN145]. Id. at 1371.  The Court of Chancery rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the repurchase 
program constituted a change in control from the company’s public stockholders to the directors and, 
accordingly, refused to review the board’s actions under Revlon.  See id.  The Court of Chancery also 
refused to accept American’s alternative argument that the board’s implementation of defensive 
measures constituted “self-dealing” that would have required the board to satisfy the heightened 
showing of “entire fairness.” Id. at 1372. 
 
[FN146]. Id. at 1372. 
 
[FN147]. Id. at 1373. 
 
[FN148]. Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)) (emphasis in 
original).  The court in Unitrin then stated that the satisfaction of Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny standard as 
a condition precedent to the application of the traditional business judgment rule had become well 
known.  See id. (citing as support for its assertion Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); 
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont 
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Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)). 
 
[FN149]. See id. at 1375. 
 
[FN150]. See id. 
 
[FN151]. See id. 
 
[FN152]. See id.  The court later segued into an examination of three general classifications of threats to 
corporate boards.  For a discussion of these threats, see infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN153]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376. 
 
[FN154]. See id. (summarizing the findings of the Court of Chancery below). 
 
[FN155]. See id. at 1376-77. 
 
[FN156]. See id. at 1376. 
 
[FN157]. See id.  Specifically, “[t]he Court of Chancery concluded that, although the Unitrin Board had 
properly perceived American General’s inadequate Offer as a threat and had properly responded to that 
threat by adopting a ‘poison pill,’ the additional defensive response of adopting the Repurchase Program 
was unnecessary and disproportionate to the threat of the Offer posed.”  Id. at 1377. 
 
[FN158]. See id. at 1376. 
 
[FN159]. See id. at 1378. 
 
[FN160]. See id. at 1380-83. 
 
[FN161]. Id. at 1383. 
 
[FN162]. See id. 
 
[FN163]. See id. at 1379-80. 
 
[FN164]. See id. at 1380. 
 
[FN165]. Id. at 1383. 
 
[FN166]. The Court of Chancery’s “erroneous” conclusion was based on three findings: (1) the Court of 
Chancery’s opinion that Unitrin’s outside directors, who were also shareholders, would not vote their 
proxies in accordance with their own best economic interests as shareholders; (2) “the objective premise 
relied upon” by the court that Unitrin’s directors needed the repurchase program to increase its absolute 
voting power in a proxy contest to twenty-five percent; and (3) what the Supreme Court found was the 
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incorrect conclusion that American would be unable to succeed in a proxy contest if the court failed to 
enjoin Unitrin’s repurchase program.  See id. at 1380-81. 
 
[FN167]. See id. at 1380.  Instead, the Supreme Court held outside directors holding substantial equity 
interests in a target company will act in their own economic interests and not in pursuit of the prestige 
and perquisites of their positions.  Id. at 1380-81.  For a cogent discussion of the impact of this 
“revolutionary aspect of Unitrin’s holding,” see Laster, supra note 59, at 116-34. 
 
[FN168]. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140, 1154 (Del. 1990)). 
 
[FN169]. See id. at 1153 n.17.  The court defined “opportunity loss” as the risk that “a hostile offer 
might deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior alternative offered by target 
management ... [or ... another bidder.]”  Id.  This type of threat is an example of the danger identified by 
the board in Time.  See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 
[FN170]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384.  The court defined “structural coercion” as “the risk that 
disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders’ tender decisions.”  Id.  
This is the kind of threat identified by Unocal’s board (i.e., a two-tier front loaded tender offer) as 
justification for instituting its selective self-tender offer.  See supra text accompanying notes 61-65. 
 
[FN171]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384.  The court defined “substantive coercion” as “the risk that 
shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management’s 
representations of intrinsic value.”  Id.  This appears to be the most ubiquitous of threats, seemingly 
available to all boards of directors who purportedly know the intrinsic value of their corporation better 
than anyone and always believe their company’s stock price to be undervalued. 
 
[FN172]. See id. 
 
[FN173]. See id. at 1388 (citing Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45-46). 
 




[FN176]. See id. 
 
[FN177]. See id.; cf. supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text  (discussing the Court of Chancery’s 
contrary conclusion that a successful proxy consent solicitation was not a practical possibility). 
 
[FN178]. See id. 
 
[FN179]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388 n.39. 
 




[FN181]. See supra text accompanying notes 75-180. 
 
[FN182]. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378. 
 
[FN183]. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 
[FN184]. See id. at 654. 
 
[FN185]. See id. 
 
[FN186]. See id. 
 
[FN187]. See id. 
 
[FN188]. Id. at 657.  When Atlas’ investment banker concluded that Blasius’ restructuring proposal 
would yield devastating harm to the short and long-term viability of the company, Atlas’ board rejected 
Blasius’ proposal and a proxy contest ensued in which Blasius sought the votes of Atlas’ shareholders 
for adopting its plan.  See id.  After Blasius lost that contest, it sought to challenge the determination of 
the outcome.  See id.  While this Article does not address the Court of Chancery’s affirmation of the 
results, the second half of the Blasius decision delves into the challenges and defenses relating thereto.  
See id. at 665-70. 
 
[FN189]. Id. at 655. 
 
[FN190]. See id.  As mentioned above, the factual circumstances of Blasius were central to that court’s 
holding:  
The conclusion that, in creating two new board positions ... and electing  [the two new 
board members] to fill those positions the board was principally motivated to prevent or 
delay the shareholders from possibly placing a majority of new members on the board, is 
critical to [the court’s] analysis of the central issue posed by [this case].  If the board in 
fact was not so motivated, but rather had taken action completely independently of the 
consent solicitation, which merely had an incidental impact upon the possible 
effectuation of any action authorized by the shareholders, it is very unlikely that such 
action would be subject to judicial nullification.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
[FN191]. See id. at 656. 
 
[FN192]. See id. at 659 (citing, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). 
 




[FN195]. Id. at 660.  Recall that by their nature, defensive measures in this context evoke the 
omnipresent concern that directors may be acting out of a desire to protect their own positions.  This 
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concern is only exacerbated when the director action in question has an effect of substantially 
comprising the rights of shareholders to elect individuals to a corporation’s board. 
 
[FN196]. See id. 
 
[FN197]. See id. at 660-62. 
 
[FN198]. Id. at 663. 
 
[FN199]. See id. 
 
[FN200]. It was this lack of bad faith that prevented Chancellor Allen from relying on Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), for invalidating the board’s actions.  See id.  In Schnell, 
dissident shareholders of Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-Craft) initiated a proxy contest to unseat and 
replace the company’s directors.  See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439-40. The shareholders in Schnell sought 
to enjoin the actions of Chris-Craft’s board in having, among other things, amended the company’s 
bylaws to change the date of the company’s annual stockholders’ meeting which, as a practical matter, 
thwarted the dissidents’ ability to prevail in the consent contest.  See id. at 439.  The court found that 
because the board had “attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware Law for the 
purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and, to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate 
efforts of [the] dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against 
management,” it had acted with “inequitable purposes contrary to established principles of corporate 
democracy.”  Id.  While the defendant directors sought to justify their actions on account of their 
“ha[ving] complied strictly with the provisions of [Section 211 of the] Delaware Corporation Law in 
changing the by-law date,” the court rejected this reasoning as misguided insofar as “inequitable action 
does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 




[FN203]. Id. at 661 (emphasis added). 
 
[FN204]. See id. at 663. 
 
[FN205]. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992).  The Supreme Court has moreover 
acknowledged the continued applicability of Schnell in this setting.  See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN206]. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 91-92.  This limitation has been in large part due to Blasius’ difficult 
“primary purpose” threshold showing. Considering that the defendant directors in Blasius admitted that 
they had intended to disenfranchise the shareholders by precluding them from electing a majority of 
Atlas’ board, the court had little trouble concluding that they fell within the ambit of its primary purpose 
showing.  In the far more common case where directors contest this issue, however, a court is left with 
the unenviable burden of trying to discern whether a defensive measure having the practical effect of 
-36- 
 
disenfranchising shareholders was adopted with the primary purpose of doing so.  See Chesapeake Corp. 
v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 
[FN207]. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
 
[FN208]. See id. at 82. 
 




[FN211]. See Allen, supra note 72, at 1316. 
 
[FN212]. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 
[FN213]. See id. at 324-29. 
 




[FN216]. See id. 
 
[FN217]. See id. 
 
[FN218]. See id. at 303. 
 
[FN219]. See id. 
 
[FN220]. See id.  “As a Virginia corporation, Chesapeake [was] authorized to--and [did--have] in place 
iron-clad defenses, including a so-called ‘dead- hand poison pill’ and a staggered board.”  Id.  
Chesapeake’s decision to never lower these defenses “effectively precluded Shorewood from presenting 
its offer to them.”  Id. 
 
[FN221]. See id. at 304. 
 
[FN222]. See id. at 305.  The defensive bylaws contemplated and approved by Shorewood’s board of 
directors included the following:  
[(1)] the elimination of the right of shareholders to call special meetings; [(2)] the 
elimination of the ability of stockholders to remove directors without cause; [(3)] the 
adoption of procedures regulating the consent solicitation process, which gave the board 
significant leeway to determine a record date; [(4)] the elimination of the stockholders’ 
ability to fill board vacancies; and [(5)] the imposition of a supermajority voting 
requirement for stockholder-initiated bylaw changes.  




[FN223]. See id.  The Shorewood board set the supermajority voting requirement for stockholder-
initiated bylaw changes at 66 2/3 %.  See id. This had the effect of rendering a successful proxy contest 
mathematically impossible for a shareholder owning 15% or less and proceeding without the support of 
management assuming a 90% voter turnout.  See id. at 306.  As will be more fully developed and 
discussed infra, the Shorewood board later modified the supermajority voting requirement to 60% 
against the backdrop of the imminent litigation in an attempt to paint the threshold as less preclusive.  
See id. at 314-15. 
 
[FN224]. See id. at 306.  More specifically, the defendants first claimed that “the [Chesapeake] offer 
was grossly inadequate and thus Shorewood stockholders faced great harm if they sold their stock at that 
price.”  Id. The defendants then posited that there was an additional “danger that Shorewood 
stockholders would be confused about the intrinsic value of the company, fail to understand 
management’s explanation as to why the market was undervaluing their stock, and mistakenly tender 
consents to Chesapeake to facilitate its unfair offer.”  Id. 
 
[FN225]. Id. at 312. 
 
[FN226]. See id. 
 
[FN227]. See id. 
 
[FN228]. See id. at 313.  The court found that discussions of the substantive coercion threat originated at 
this meeting as opposed to the earlier ones claimed by Shorewood.  See id. 
 
[FN229]. See id. 
 
[FN230]. See id. at 314. 
 
[FN231]. Id. at 316.  Shorewood countered that Chesapeake had become an  “interested shareholder” for 
the purposes of Delaware’s business combination statute and further claimed that Delaware law forbade 
shareholders “from amending their corporation’s bylaws to eliminate a staggered board provision and 
then instilling a new board.”  Id. at 317.  This Article focuses on the relevant standards of review for 
assessing the board’s decision to adopt the supermajority bylaw.  As such, this Article does not address 
the additional claims advanced by Chesapeake or the counterclaims put forth by Shorewood.  For a 
discussion of those claims and counterclaims, see id. at 316-17. 
 




[FN234]. See id. 
 
[FN235]. Id. at 319-20. 
 




[FN237]. For a more in-depth discussion of the interrelationship between Unocal and Blasius, see infra 
Part IV. 
 
[FN238]. See Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323-24. 
 
[FN239]. See id. at 324. 
 
[FN240]. See supra note 171 (quoting the Delaware Supreme Court’s definition of substantive 
coercion). 
 
[FN241]. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 329.  The court then quoted Professors Gilson and Kraakman’s 
assessment of the need for “close judicial scrutiny of defensive measures” adopted in response to the 
threat of substantive coercion.  
[S]ubstantive coercion is a slippery concept. To note abstractly that management might 
know shareholder interests better than shareholders themselves do cannot be a basis for 
rubber-stamping management’s pro forma claims in the face of market skepticism and the 
enormous opportunity losses that threaten target shareholders when hostile offers are 
defeated. Preclusive defensive tactics are gambles made on behalf of target shareholders 
by presumptively self-interested players.  Although shareholders may win or lose in each 
transaction, they would almost certainly be better off on average if the gamble were never 
made in the absence of meaningful judicial review.  By minimizing management’s ability 
to further its self- interest in selecting its response to a hostile offer, an effective 
proportionality test can raise the odds that management resistance, when it does occur, 
will increase shareholder value.  
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. 
Law. 247, 274 (1989)). 
 
[FN242]. See id. at 330. 
 
[FN243]. See id. at 343. 
 
[FN244]. See id. at 330-31 (“Although no one will ever point to the Shorewood board’s actions as a 
model of how to analyze an acquisition bid, [the court was] persuaded that the board had sufficient, 
good faith reasons to conclude that [the offers] were inadequate from a price perspective.”). 
 
[FN245]. See id. at 332-33. 
 
[FN246]. See id. at 306-07.  In fact, the court found that “this threat appear[ed] to have emerged out of 
Shorewood’s ‘A Team’ of advisors [at later meetings].”  Id. at 332. 
 
[FN247]. Id. at 308. 
 
[FN248]. See id. 
 




[FN250]. Id. at 316. 
 
[FN251]. Id. at 333.  “Indeed [, continued the court], it discussed no threats that day at all, relying on its 
prior determination of the threats posed by Chesapeake’s offer.”  Id. 
 
[FN252]. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).  The Court of Chancery noted the Supreme Court’s failure in 
Unitrin to strike down the target’s repurchase program notwithstanding the fact that the majorities 
required by the acquiror in that case “exceed[ed] any margin ever achieved by President Franklin 
Roosevelt [and] seem[ed] to present a rather formidable and, one might daresay, preclusive barrier to the 
insurgent.”  Id. at 325-26. 
 
[FN253]. Id. at 334. 
 
[FN254]. Id.  The court used this impossibility as evidence for illustrating “how blind the Shorewood 
board was to the relevance of whether the Supermajority Bylaw was preclusive. ...”  Id. 
 
[FN255]. Id. (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995)). 
 




[FN258]. See id. 
 
[FN259]. Id. at 343.  The court observed that:  
The board already had a poison pill in place that gave it breathing room and precluded the 
Tender Offer.  The Defensive Bylaws had eliminated Chesapeake’s ability to call a 
special meeting, at which a majority of a quorum could act.  This forced Chesapeake to 
proceed through the slower route of a consent solicitation with the minimum support of a 
majority of the outstanding shares.  The Shorewood board controlled, per the Defensive 
Bylaws, the record date.  This guaranteed adequate time for communications and counter- 
solicitation efforts, as well as for the board to develop and consider strategic alternatives.  
Id. 
 
[FN260]. See id. (supporting the court’s conclusion that the supermajority bylaw was a disproportionate 
response to the mild threat posed by Chesapeake’s offer). 
 
[FN261]. See id.  Recall that Chesapeake had indicated its willingness to negotiate with Shorewood as to 
price and structure.  See id. at 303. 
 
[FN262]. Id. at 343. 
 




[FN264]. Id. The court observed that the eighty-eight percent vote required of disinterested shareholders, 
unlike the Supreme Court’s finding in Unitrin, was not “‘realistically’ attainable.”  Id.  The court also 
focused on the sophisticated stockholder base of Shorewood’s shareholders as compared to those in 
Unitrin, in addition to the absence of material financial interests on the part of the directors in Unitrin 
which were present in Chesapeake.  See id.  Finally, the court noted the “grossly insufficient” level of 
attention that the Shorewood board paid to the ramifications resulting from its decision to adopt the 
supermajority bylaw amendment and other defensive measures.  See id. 
 




[FN267]. See id. 
 
[FN268]. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 
[FN269]. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 317-18. The court in Chesapeake noted that the above question was 
one that had perplexed Delaware courts for over a decade.  See id. at 317. 
 
[FN270]. See supra Part I.D. 
 
[FN271]. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954  (Del. 1985). 
 
[FN272]. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989). 
 
[FN273]. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN274]. See Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 329. 
 
[FN275]. As stated by the Court of Chancery in Blasius:  
A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from creating a majority of new 
board positions and filling them does not involve the exercise of the corporation’s power 
over its property, or with respect to its rights or obligations; rather, it involves allocation, 
between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with respect to 
governance of the corporation.  
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 
[FN276]. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 319 (quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663). 
 
[FN277]. See, e.g., State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. CIV. A. 17637, 2000 WL 
1805376, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (observing that “[i]n the context of takeover defenses, the 
Delaware courts have forcefully written that board actions that affect the rights of shareholders to vote 
are deeply suspect”).  As support for this assertion, the court in Peerless cited the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378 (“This Court has been and remains assiduous in its concern about 
defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising 
stockholders.”) and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 34, 42 
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(“Because of the overriding importance of voting rights, this Court and the Court of Chancery have 
consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with such rights.”). 
 
[FN278]. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992). 
 
[FN279]. See id. at 82. 
 
[FN280]. See id. at 91-92; see also Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 320  (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Stroud). 
 
[FN281]. Indeed, this approach has also been advocated in the widely circulated article co-authored by 
former Chancellor Allen and current Vice Chancellors Jacobs and Strine.  
  See Allen, supra note 72, at 1311-15. 
 
[FN282]. See id. at 1314. 
 
[FN283]. See id. at 1315 n.111 (reiterating that the authors’  “recommendation that voting issues be 
reviewed under Unocal rests on the assumption that courts will apply that test with rigor and that the 
doctrine of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. ... retains vitality.”). 
 
[FN284]. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text. 
 
[FN285]. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 320-21 (emphasis added).  The Court of Chancery observed that after 
discussing the overlap between Blasius and Unocal, the court in Unitrin “appeared to eschew any 
application of the compelling justification test” to its assessment of the defendant-board’s defensive 
action.  See id. at 321. 
 
[FN286]. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995). 
 
[FN287]. Id. at 1378-79. 
 
[FN288]. See Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 321 (observing that despite preliminarily mentioning the import 
of Blasius, the Supreme Court in Unitrin “never cited to Blasius after that point in its opinion, never 
referenced or applied the compelling justification standard, and, to the contrary, emphasized the latitude 
a board of directors must be given to adopt reasonable defensive measures in its business judgment”).  
See generally Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1878-91. 
 
[FN289]. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1380-83. 
 
[FN290]. Allen, supra note 72, at 1316. 
 
[FN291]. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323. 
 




[FN293]. Cf. Allen, supra note 72, at 1315 n.111; Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323 (stating that there would 
be less of a need for Blasius if Unocal were applied “with a gimlet eye out for inequitably motivated 
electoral manipulations or for subjectively well-intentioned board action that has preclusive or coercive 
effects”). 
 
[FN294]. See supra Part II.D (discussing Blasius and that decision’s inherently unascertainable “primary 
purpose” showing). 
 
[FN295]. The Court of Chancery recently observed that “Blasius does not only apply in cases involving 
hostile acquirers [sic] or directors wishing to retain their position against the will of the shareholders. ... 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty between a board of directors and the shareholders of a corporation is 
always implicated where the board seeks to thwart the action of the company’s shareholders.”  State of 
Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 
2000).  Because this Article explores the interrelationship between Unocal and Blasius for those 
directorial decisions taken against unwelcome suitors vying for corporate control, the expanded 
“substantial effect” approach discussed herein should be limited to those managerial actions preventing 
shareholders from electing a dissident shareholder’s directors.  In other words, the position of this 
Article is only directed toward the more “typical Blasius case that involves entrenchment or control 
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